Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Ramchair by Maehr, Joseph
Touro Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 2 Article 14 
May 2014 
Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Ramchair 
Joseph Maehr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Maehr, Joseph (2014) "Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Ramchair," Touro Law Review: Vol. 24 : 
No. 2 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/14 
This Effective Assistance of Counsel is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Ramchair 
Cover Page Footnote 
24-2 
This effective assistance of counsel is available in Touro Law Review: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/
lawreview/vol24/iss2/14 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Ramchair'
(decided March 29, 2007)
Racky Ramchair's conviction of first and second degree rob-
bery was affirmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department.2
Ramchair was granted leave to appeal after filing a petition for writ
of error coram nobis,3 after the defendant's application was denied
by the Appellate Division without comment.4 Ramchair claimed that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his appeal in vi-
olation of the United States Constitution5 and the New York State
Constitution,6 when his appellate counsel failed to argue the trial
court erred when it denied his trial attorney's motion for a mistrial.7
The New York Court of Appeals denied Ramchair's petition and af-
firmed the Appellate Division's order.8
Cabdriver Austin Olek was held at gunpoint and robbed by
864 N.E.2d 1288 (N.Y. 2007).
2 People v. Ramchair, 764 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726-27 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2003).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (8th ed. 2004) ("A writ of error directed to a court for
review of its own judgment and predicated on alleged errors of fact.").
4 Ramchair, 864 N.E.2d at 1290.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VI states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 states, in pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the
party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil
actions .... (emphasis added).
7 Ramchair, 864 N.E.2d at 1290-91.
8 Id. at 1291. The court held, as a matter of law, that the appellate counsel was not inef-
fective for merely choosing not to argue one possible issue on appeal (the mistrial applica-
tion), where counsel vigorously argued a defense that constituted a reasonable appellate
strategy. Id.
1
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two male passengers in his cab on April 30, 1995. 9 Olek told the po-
lice one of the perpetrators was black and the other, Ramchair, was
Guyanese.10 Fifteen minutes after Olek picked up the two men as a
fare in Queens, the black man grabbed Olek by the neck, "put a gun
to his head, and threatened to 'blow his head off.' ""' The men stole
Olek's cab after one of them had shoved the unfortunate cabdriver
out of the car and snatched forty dollars from the his hand.' 2 Olek
fought back, and was able to escape and call the police.'
3
Ramchair was eventually arrested for suspected robbery. On
June 15, 1995, Olek viewed a lineup that Detective Winnik composed
of the defendant and five "fillers."'' 4 Ramchair's appointed counsel,
Jonathan T. Latimer, was at the lineup. 15 To mitigate differences in
hair style or color, the fillers were instructed to cover their heads with
baseball caps. 16 In a further effort to minimize the differences among
the fillers, the detective had the fillers rub carbon paper on their faces
to make it appear as if they had facial hair similar to the defendant.' 7
Thereafter, Olek identified Ramchair as one of the two passengers
who robbed him, and Ramchair was subsequently charged with first
and second degree robbery.
18
Latimer continued to represent Ramchair and moved to sup-
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press the identification "on the ground that the lineup was unnecessa-
rily suggestive," because Ramchair was the only Guyanese in the
lineup.' 9 Claiming the lineup was prejudicial, Latimer moved for
suppression because when Olek reported the incident to the police
and testified in court, he explained he knew one of the perpetrators
was Guyanese. 20 Olek had reported and testified that the perpetrator
was Guyanese and claimed this was "an important characteristic" to
him in his identification.21 In the suppression motion, Latimer argued
that because Ramchair was the only person in the lineup to fit the de-
scription of a Guyanese, the lineup was prejudicial to his identifica-
tion.22 The motion, however, was denied.23
At the first trial, before Detective Winnik was able to testify
about the lineup, Ramchair's request for a mistrial was granted be-
cause an assault in jail rendered him incapable of assisting his coun-
sel in his own defense.24
During the defendant's second trial, defense counsel asserted
Olek's identification was tainted.25 Detective Winnik testified he
could not identify who the attorney present at the lineup was, just as
he had previously testified at the suppression hearing.26 Additionally,
Winnik never testified the counsel, Latimer, who was present at the
19 Ramchair, 2005 WL 2786975, at *2.
20 Id. at * 1.
21 Id.
22 Id. at *2.
23 Id.





Maehr: Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Ramchair
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
lineup, objected to the lineup procedure or its composition.27 After
deliberation had begun, a juror was hospitalized due to chest pains
and the court declared a second mistrial over defense's objection.28
Subsequently, after the second mistrial, the defense moved that, in
the event of a third trial, Ramchair would be placed in double jeopar-
dy, but the court denied the motion.29 The judge recognized the at-
tachment of double jeopardy, but reasoned the mistrial was necessary
due to the juror's condition and because no other possible alternatives
were available.3°
During the third trial, Latimer maintained the same defense,
challenging Olek's identification even though Olek's testimony re-
mained unchanged. 3  Detective Winnik, however, made two addi-
tional assertions during the course of his testimony that he had failed
to make during the second trial or the suppression hearing.32 Winnik
now testified it was Latimer who was present at the lineup, when he
previously could not recall this information.33 Winnik also testified
that Latimer failed to raise any objections to the procedure or compo-
sition of the lineup, thus implying Latimer's consent to a fair lineup
and essentially transformed Latimer into a witness-because the only
way for him to rebut the implication would be to take the stand and
testify on his own behalf.
34
27 Id.
28 Ramchair, 2005 WL 2786975, at *2, 3.




33 Ramchair, 2005 WL 2786975, at *3.
34 Id. at *4.
[Vol. 24
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Although Latimer had valid reasons to stay silent at the line-
up,35 the judge did not allow him to testify as to those reasons why he
thought it was unfair.36 After protracted objections to Winnik's tes-
timony and the line of questioning, Latimer was overruled and for-
bidden to rebut Winnik's testimony.37 Ramchair was sentenced to
two concurrent terms, ten to twenty years for first degree robbery and
five to ten years for second degree robbery.
38
On appeal, Ramchair was represented by new counsel who
argued Ramchair's rights were violated, asserting the third trial put
him in double jeopardy because the judge improperly declared the
second trial a mistrial, though the defense objected.39 But due to the
extenuating circumstance of the hospitalized juror, the appellate court
reasoned that the "mistrial was manifestly necessary" and it was
"physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with
the law.",
40
Ramchair's new counsel also argued a constitutional right to
raise a defense was deprived during the third trial, when the trial
judge did not permit Latimer to rebut the testimony elicited by the
prosecutor from Detective Winnik.4' The appellate court determined
it was proper to exclude Latimer's proposed testimony because he
35 Id. at *7 (asserting both the use of carbon paper and the lineup composition were objec-
tionable and any changes would have been superficial, but as a result, if counsel did not ob-
ject then the " 'police have put themselves in the position to assert that defense counsel was
consulted and assisted in the same lineup procedure that is later challenged as unfair' ").
36 Id. at *8 (paraphrasing an affidavit submitted to the Court regarding "why defense
counsel might stay silent even during an unfair line-up").
31 Id. at *4-6.
38 Ramchair, 2005 WL 2786975, at *7.
39 Ramchair, 764 N.Y.S.2d at 726.
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was still acting in a representative capacity and thus could not also be
a witness.
42
The appellate counsel notably did not argue the trial court
erred by denying Latimer's motion for a mistrial before the third trial
commenced.43 On that contention, Ramchair went before the New
York Court of Appeals, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to raise the issue on appeal.4
Because Ramchair filed a petition for habeas relief that was
held in abeyance until he exhausted all his state claims, it is important
to analyze Ramchair's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel un-
der both the federal and state standards. 45 The federal standard used
to assess whether a defendant's rights have been violated by ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington.46
The Strickland Court created a rule to ensure a fair trial for the de-
fendant and preserve the defendant's Sixth Amendment right under
the United States Constitution.47
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution pre-
scribes certain rights of the accused, including the right to effective
42 Id. at 726-27.
43 Ramchair, 864 N.E.2d 1288, 1290-91.
44 Id. at 1289, 1291. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division
and held that "defendant was [not] denied meaningful representation when his appellate
counsel failed to argue that the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial," be-
cause there was a "solid legal basis for appellate counsel's strategy." The court held that "as
a matter of law" the appellate counsel was not ineffective for merely choosing not to argue a
possible issue on appeal in further detail (the mistrial application), where they vigorously
argued a defense argument on such appeal that constituted a reasonable appellate strategy.
Id. at 1291.
45 Ramchair, 2005 WL 2786975, at * 18.
46 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
47 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85 ("The Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the
Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the sev-
eral provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the counsel clause.").
[Vol. 24
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assistance of counsel.48 In Strickland, the defendant committed a ple-
thora of crimes, specifically, "murders, torture, kidnapping, severe
assaults, attempted murders, attempted extortion, and theft., 49 The
defendant pleaded guilty to all charges, confessed to three murders
and waived his right to a trial by jury against his experienced coun-
sel's advice. 50 During the plea allocution, the defendant "told the tri-
al judge that . . . [he] had no significant prior criminal record [and
that] . . . [during the crime spree] . . . he was under extreme stress
caused by his inability to support his family.
51
After the testimony provided by the defendant during his plea,
defendant's counsel did not ask for a psychiatric examination because
there was no indication, based on defendant's counsel's conversa-
tions and interactions with the client, that the client had psychological
problems.52 The defendant's counsel claimed he relied on the plea
allocution for the information regarding defendant's background and
his defense of extreme emotional duress because the State would not
be able to cross-examine the defendant on his claim or proffer its own
psychiatric evidence.53 Lastly, the defense counsel never requested a
pre-sentence report because it would have included defendant's crim-
inal history, which was plainly contradictive to what the defendant
told the judge during the plea allocution.54 The defendant waived his
right to an advisory jury during sentencing, again against his coun-
48 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
49 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 671-72.
51 Id. at 672.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 673.
53 Id.
54 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673.
2008]
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sel's wishes and chose to be sentenced by the judge, who sentenced
him to death for each murder committed and years in prison for all
the other crimes he committed. 5
Thus, after an exhaustive appellate process from state to fed-
eral court, the defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
The defendant based this claim on his trial counsel's failure to re-
quest a pre-sentence report, failure "to request a psychiatric report"
and failure to "investigate and present character witnesses," all of
which, he argued, violated his Sixth Amendment rights.5 6 The Su-
preme Court found no serious error in the decisions made by the de-
fendant's trial counsel, as each decision was a strategic one, which
ultimately resulted in the exclusion of the criminal record, detrimen-
tal evidence at the sentencing stage, and the psychiatric-cross and
character evidence that could otherwise have been proffered by the
state.57 The Court found defendant's counsel to be effective after ap-
plying a two prong test created in order to assess the effectiveness of
counsel.58
The Supreme Court reasoned the adversarial system is depen-
dent on the critical role played by counsel, since it is the counsel's
skill set that is necessary to aid in the accused's defense in order to
meet the prosecution's case.59 "Thus a fair trial is one in which evi-
dence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tri-
5 Id. at 672, 675.
56 Id. at 675.
7 Id. at 699.
58 Id. at 700 (requiring defendant to show both deficient performance and sufficient preju-
dice for a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
'9 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
396 [Vol. 24
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bunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.,
60
Therefore, counsel's assistance is deemed ineffective where a law-
yer's conduct undermined the purpose of the adversarial process to
the point where the trial cannot be deemed fair because it created an
unjust or unreliable result.61 The constitutional command prescribed
by the Sixth Amendment requires from an attorney more than mere
presence at trial to guarantee the rights afforded to the accused.62 The
Court concluded "the right to counsel is the right to the effective as-
sistance of counsel.
63
The Court cited two different situations where a defendant's
rights can be violated by ineffective assistance of counsel.64 The
first, and more direct, is where the government actually interferes
with counsel's ability to make independent decisions regarding a
client's defense. 65 The second is where counsel fails to provide a mi-
nimally adequate measure of representation. 66 In short, the Constitu-
tion contemplates a minimum acceptable level of service from de-
fense counsel, and service that falls below that level deprives a
defendant of a protected right. The two prong test, created to deter-
mine whether the counsel had failed to provide effective counsel, is
as follows:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's perfor-
mance was deficient. This requires showing that
60 id.
61 Id. at 686.
62 Id. at 685.
63 Id. at 686 (internal quotations omitted).
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counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense. This requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.67
Both of the elements in the test must be met to establish inef-
fective assistance of counsel. 68 Although the defendant's counsel in
Strickland did fail to perform certain tasks, his conduct was not
deemed unreasonable, as he sought to exclude detrimental evidence
and possible expert testimony in order to sustain the mitigating fac-
tors. In short, he appeared to have a plan.69 "Because advocacy is an
art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires defe-
rence to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices must be res-
pected in these circumstances if they are based on professional judg-
ment.' 70  Thus, defendant's counsel's decision to omit those tasks
should be respected and granted deference, where such omissions
were based on the exercise of "reasonable professional judgment.
71
Lastly, defense counsel's omissions in no way prejudiced the
outcome of the trial, 72 because even if everything the defendant com-
67 Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
68 Id.
69 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 ("The proper measure of attorney performance remains
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.").
70 Id. at681.
71 Id.
72 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) ("To establish prejudice he 'must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' "(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).
398 [Vol. 24
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plained his counsel failed to do had been done, it would not amount
to enough mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factors to
avoid a sentence of death, as the Judge found all three murders "es-
pecially heinous, atrocious, and cruel, all involving repeated stab-
bings. ' 73
In contrast, federal courts have found that counselors who
supply erroneous advice to their clients regarding their possibility of
parole eligibility have acted deficiently. 74 In Meyers v. Gillis, the de-
fendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder after repeatedly
bludgeoning his victim with a baseball bat.75 The defendant's coun-
sel informed him if he pled guilty, he would be eligible for parole in
seven years.76 The advice regarding the parole proved to be wrong,
as second degree murder carried with it a mandatory life sentence
without the possibility for parole in Pennsylvania." The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the Strickland test, and the de-
fendant was granted relief because his counsel's conduct was deemed
to be ineffective.78 The court found that the defendant satisfied both
prongs when it concluded the advice proffered by trial counsel was "
'grossly misleading' " and thus counsel did not meet the "objective
standard of reasonableness" afforded by the first prong of the Strick-
73 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 674, 678 ("The plain fact is that the aggravating circumstances
proved in this case were completely overwhelming..." (quoting Application to Petition for
Certiorari at A230, Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1981) (No. 59741))).




78 Id. at 666-67.
2008] 399
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land test.7 9 The court concluded there was enough testimony on the
record to support defendant's claim of erroneous advice and ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, thus prejudicing the defendant and satisfy-
ing the second prong of the Strickland test.80 The court concluded,
"Meyers has met his burden of showing that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsels' erroneous advice, he would not
have ... [pleaded] guilty, and that he has been prejudiced by doing
SO.
8 1
However, New York has followed a different test, articulated
in People v. Baldi,82 to determine whether a defendant received effec-
tive assistance of counsel.83 The standard established by Baldi is one
of "meaningful representation., 84  Joseph Baldi was convicted of
separate, unrelated crimes at two different trials.85 On September 5,
1971, after the first set of crimes was committed, the defendant was
approached by two investigating officers, who were responding to a
prowler complaint in the area. 86 The officers asked for Baldi's identi-
fication; he responded by pulling out a handgun and fired it at the po-
lice.87 The gun misfired and Baldi was disarmed, arrested and
charged with "attempted murder of a police officer, burglary, and
possession of a weapon." 88 Defendant was sent to a state hospital as
" Meyers, 142 F.3d at 666-67 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
80 Id. at 670.
8 Id. at 668.
82 429 N.E.2d400 (N.Y. 1981).
83 See Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 400.
84 Id. at 405.
85 Id. at 401.
86 Id. at 401-02.
87 id.
88 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 402.
400 [Vol. 24
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he was deemed unfit to stand trial; he was released in less than a
year.89
On June 17, 1972, Deborah Januszko, who was fifteen years
old, was stabbed to death in her sleep after leaving a bedroom win-
dow open, and Baldi was questioned after being found in this area at
5:00 a.m., three days after her murder.90 Subsequently, when ques-
tioned at the police station, "Baldi went into a trance-like state and
pantomimed the stabbing."9' The following day, after several other
acted-out confessions, Sidney Sparrow was assigned to defendant
Baldi for the Januszko slaying and later assumed Baldi's defense for
the crimes committed on September 5, 1971, including the attempted
murder of a police officer.92 Baldi eventually admitted to the Janusz-
ko slaying again and to three other murders and ten assaults on wom-
en, but after a Huntley hearing,93 these confessions were suppressed
due to Sparrow's successful arguments.94 However, the court ruled
the original pantomimed confession was voluntary and admissible in
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Id. at 402-03.
92 Id. at 402-03.
93 Dianne K. Leverrier, People v. Berg, 16 TOURO L. REv. 703, 704 n. 15 (2000).
[E]stablishing the Huntley hearing: a separate proceeding in a criminal
case wherein "[tihe Judge must find voluntariness [of the confession]
beyond a reasonable doubt before the confession can be submitted to the
trial jury. The burden of proof as to voluntariness is on the People. The
prosecutor must, within a reasonable time before trial, notify the defense
as to whether any alleged confession or admission will be offered in evi-
dence at the trial. If such notice be given by the People[,] the defense, if
it intends to attack the confession or admission as involuntary, must, in
turn, notify the prosecutor of a desire by the defense of a preliminary
hearing on the such issue."
Id. (citing People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179, 183 (1965) (alteration in original)).
94 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 403-04 (indicating Baldi's constitutional rights would have been
violated if the statements were not suppressed).
2008] 401
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the murder trial.95
When defendant's insanity defense failed, defendant lost both
trials and was sentenced for the attempted murder of a police officer
and the murder of Januszko. 96 In an attempt to bolster the defen-
dant's insanity defense, and with the consent of both the prosecution
and the court, Sparrow testified to the defendant's behavior that he
personally witnessed in both of the trials and the Huntley hearing.
97
The defendant acquired new counsel on appeal and alleged that his
constitutional rights were violated due to ineffective assistance of
counsel on the part of Sparrow.98 The appellate court reversed the
convictions after it found Sparrow's assistance of counsel ineffec-
tive. 99 The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate
court's order and declared that Sparrow's conduct satisfied the state's
effective assistance of counsel standard. 100
The Court of Appeals' primary concern was to establish an
approach to analyze the effective assistance of counsel, without im-
plementing an inflexible standard that would confuse effectiveness
with losing tactics as a result of a retrospective analysis.'0 1 The court
recognized two different standards were being used to analyze coun-
sel's effectiveness. 10 2 The first standard was "[t]he traditional stan-
dard. . . whether the attorney's shortcomings were such as to render
9' Id. at 403.
96 Id. at 404.
9' Id. at 403.
98 Id. at 404.
99 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 404.
'oo Id. at 407, 408.
101 Id. at 405.
102 Id. at 404.
[Vol. 24
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the 'trial a farce and a mockery of justice.' "103 The second was the
federal standard, "whether the attorney exhibited 'reasonable compe-
tence,' " determined by the Strickland test.10 4 The Court of Appeals
chose not to adopt either of the existing tests and instead created the
"meaningful representation" test: "[s]o long as the evidence, the law,
and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as
of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided
meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement [for effec-
tive assistance of counsel] will have been met."'0 5
The court concluded Sparrow did, in fact, provide meaningful
representation given the evidence presented (a confession to murder),
the circumstances of the case (an allegedly insane repeat offender),
and his innovative way to bolster his client's defense by testifying as
a lay person to his client's unusual behavior. 10 6 "His professional
conduct cannot be said either to have been unreasonable or to have
made a farce and mockery of the trial.' 0 7
Subsequently, in People v. Stultz, 10 8 the Court of Appeals ex-
tended the meaningful representation standard to appellate counsel as
well. 10 9 The defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for
second degree murder and weapons possession."0 On the eve of tri-
al, a witness came forward and claimed she had witnessed the murder
103 Id.
104 Baldi, 429 N.E.2d at 405 (quoting People v. Aiken, 380 N.E.2d 272, 275 (N.Y. 1978)).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 407.
107 Id. at 408.
108 810 N.E.2d 883 (N.Y. 2004).
109 Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 886.
"0 Id. at 884.
2008]
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and it was not the defendant, but another person who she knew, who
was the shooter."1 However, the witness refused to testify, evoking
her privilege against self-incrimination and the defense counsel never
tried to get the witness's statements into evidence.1 12 After the sen-
tence was confirmed on appeal, the defendant argued his rights were
violated by ineffective assistance of counsel because his appellate
counsel did not attack the trial counsel's failure to proffer the wit-
ness's statements into evidence. 13
In determining whether to extend the "meaningful representa-
tion" standard to appellate counsel, the court began with the principal
that criminal defendants are afforded both a state and federal consti-
tutional right to have their appellate counsel render effective assis-
tance. '1 4 Specifically, the New York Constitution reads, in part, "In
any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to
appear and defend in person and with counsel .... 115 Additionally,
the court noted it was important that it retained Baldi when evaluat-
ing whether trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel as
opposed to the adoption of the federal standard.' 16 The court ulti-
mately held that the "53-page brief, prepared by two lawyers highly
experienced in criminal law and appeals," where their brief reflected
their skill, did "meaningfully represent" their client because it reflect-
ed a "competent grasp of the facts, the law and appellate procedure,
"' Id.
112 Id. at 885.
13 Id.
114 Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 886.
115 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
..6 Stultz, 810 N.E.2d at 886.
[Vol. 24
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supported by appropriate authority and argument." 17
Although both the federal and state standards for determining
ineffective assistance of counsel appear the same, the New York
State standard is a more flexible one.118 New York does not require
the quantum of prejudice found in the Strickland test, nor does it re-
quire the "defendant to show that, but for counsel's ineffectiveness,
the outcome would probably have been different."'" 19 The New York
standard of "meaningful representation" regards "a defendant's
showing of prejudice as a significant but not indispensable element in
assessing meaningful representation."' 120  Under the Strickland test,
however, a federal court would not be able to disregard such preju-
dice, except where counsel's performance was deemed not deficient,
but then the application of the test would be moot, as neither prong
could be satisfied.' 21 The "meaningful representation" test is a more
subjectively flexible standard due to its many factors, thus making it
more difficult to apply consistently. By probability alone, when one
takes into consideration all of the factors the judges must look at in
order to make a determination, (evidence, the law, and the circums-
tances of a particular case viewed in totality and as of the time of the
representation), the test is more likely to be applied conflictingly.
1 7 Id. at 888 ("Effective appellate representation by no means requires counsel to brief or
argue every issue that may have merit. When it comes to the choice of issues, appellate law-
yers have latitude in deciding which points to advance and how to order them.").
118 Id. at 887.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Edward Puerta, Note, People v. Dillard, 23 TouRo LAW. REV. 425, 434 ("Unlike
federal courts, a New York appellate court may find that although a verdict of 'guilty' would
have resulted despite the best theoretical defense strategy, relief in the form of a new trial is
justified because the strategy actually presented was meaningless.").
2008] 405
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Due to these contrasting standards, a hybrid approach ("Hybr-
id test") might be more appropriate to determine whether an attorney
has provided effective assistance of counsel. Some scholars believe a
categorical checklist of the duties imposed upon counsel by their
clients' constitutional rights would force the courts to actually "de-
cide what is meant by" ineffective assistance of counsel and thus,
what is actually required of an attorney to effectuate such assis-
tance.1 22 The Hybrid test would be a two-tiered system utilizing a ca-
tegorical checklist as the floor of the standard, not the ceiling, and,
where the case is so unique it cannot be assessed by the simplistic
approach of the first tier, it shall then be assessed under the second
tier, by applying the Strickland test to determine effectiveness, ulti-
mately based on the reasonableness of the attorney's conduct. 
2 3
Ultimately, if Ramchair takes an appeal to the Supreme Court,
and unless the Court looks past the four corners of Ramchair's argu-
ment to the underlying claim in his due process argument, "that the
trial court erred by failing to grant Latimer's motion for a mistrial,"
the case will be decided analogously to Strickland v. Washington.
24
122 Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard
For Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 437 (1988).
Utilizing a list of objective criteria that constitute effective representa-
tion, the first tier would grant the defendant relief upon proof that his de-
fense attorney failed to substantially satisfy one of these basic criteria
provided that the government fails to prove that the omission was either
justified or insubstantial. If, however, the representation satisfied all of
the first tier's objective criteria and the defendant nevertheless alleges
that counsel's performance was unreasonable due to the unusual cir-
cumstances of his case, then the claim would be evaluated, in the second
tier, under the more stringent, two-prong Strickland standard.
121 Id. at 442.




Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 2, Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/14
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
For example, in Ramchair, defense counsel did not argue that the
court erred in denying defenses' motion for a mistrial, just as counsel
in Strickland did not argue emotional duress with expert testimony.
In Strickland, where the defense had a valid reason to not implore the
psychiatric tactic, the court deemed it reasonable. Ramchair's coun-
sel just as likely had a valid reason not to argue mistrial, as the coun-
sel may have thought there was a greater chance to pursue a defense
argument, thus the court will deem their conduct reasonable, just as
they did in Strickland and the cases will be decided the same, with
the attorneys deemed to have given effective counsel.
125
Joseph Maehr
125 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (establishing that because law requires "deference to coun-
sel's informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstance if they
are based on [reasonably] professional judgment").
2008]
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EXCESSIVE FINES
United States Constitution Amendment VIII:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
New York Constitution article I, section 5:
Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor
shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted ....
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